A Non-Cooperative Multiple Access Game for Timely Updates by Gopal, Sneihil et al.
A Non-Cooperative Multiple Access Game for
Timely Updates
Sneihil Gopal∗, Sanjit K. Kaul∗, Rakesh Chaturvedi†, Sumit Roy‡
∗Wireless Systems Lab, IIIT-Delhi, India
†Department of Social Sciences & Humanities, IIIT-Delhi, India
‡University of Washington, Seattle, WA
{sneihilg, skkaul, rakesh}@iiitd.ac.in, sroy@uw.edu
Abstract—We consider a network of selfish nodes that would
like to minimize the age of their updates at the other nodes.
The nodes send their updates over a shared spectrum using a
CSMA/CA based access mechanism. We model the resulting com-
petition as a non-cooperative one-shot multiple access game and
investigate equilibrium strategies for two distinct medium access
settings (a) collisions are shorter than successful transmissions
and (b) collisions are longer. We investigate competition in a
CSMA/CA slot, where a node may choose to transmit or stay idle.
We find that medium access settings exert strong incentive effects
on the nodes. We show that when collisions are shorter, transmit
is a weakly dominant strategy. This leads to all nodes transmitting
in the CSMA/CA slot, therefore guaranteeing a collision. In
contrast, when collisions are longer, no weakly dominant strategy
exists and under certain conditions on the ages at the beginning
of the slot, we derive the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet-of-Things (IoT) will have large numbers of
devices sense and communicate information (either their own
status or that of their proximate environment) to a network co-
ordinator/aggregator or to other devices. Applications include
real-time monitoring for disaster management, environmental
monitoring, industrial control and surveillance, which require
timely delivery of updates to a central station. Another set of
popular applications include vehicular networking for future
autonomous operations where each vehicular node broadcasts
a vector (e.g. position, velocity and other status information)
to enable applications like collision avoidance and platooning.
Given the many applications, it is essential to investigate
spectrum sharing by nodes that would like freshness of infor-
mation. We measure freshness using the age of information [1]
metric. We consider N selfish nodes that share spectrum via
a CSMA/CA (carrier sensed multiple access with collision
avoidance) based access mechanism. Each node would like
to minimize the age of its status at the other nodes in the
network.
We model the competition for the shared spectrum as a non-
cooperative one-shot multiple access game parameterized by
the age of every node and the medium access settings. This is
motivated by the following consideration. The interaction for
spectrum access is most realistically modeled as a repeated
game [2] in which the ages of the nodes constitute the
state of the system that endogenously evolve as a result of
players’ strategies over time [3]. Methodologically, however, it
is important to understand the one-shot game and its equilibria
first before delving into a detailed analysis of the repeated
game. Therefore, in this work, we restrict ourselves to a one-
shot game that is played by the nodes in a CSMA/CA slot.
We assume that each node knows the ages of status updates
at the beginning of the slot and can choose either to transmit
during a slot or stay idle. We investigate the equilibrium
strategies for two distinct medium access settings. Specifically,
we consider when a collision (which is when multiple trans-
missions overlap resulting in all being decoded in error) is
shorter than the length of a successful (interference free) data
transmission. This is, for example, the case when networks use
the RTS/CTS based access mechanism defined for the 802.11
MAC [4]. Alternately, a collision may be at least as long as
the length of a successful transmission. For example, when
networks use the basic access mechanism [4] of the 802.11
MAC.
We find that medium access settings exert strong incentive
effects on the nodes. We show that when the collision slot
is smaller than the successful transmission slot, transmitting
during a slot is a weakly dominant strategy. This result is
independent of the initial ages. This, of course, leads to
wastage of the shared spectrum and the age of updates of
none of the nodes is reduced at the end of the slot. On the
other hand, the access setting where collision is longer, no
dominant strategy exists. In this case, we analytically derive
the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium for when the ages at the
beginning of the slot satisfy certain conditions.
Our work provides insights into how competing nodes that
value timeliness would share the spectrum under different
medium access settings. Specifically, our results indicate that
under decentralized decision making by nodes, the access
setting with longer successful transmissions is more vulnerable
to collisions than the other.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
discusses the related works followed by the network model
in Section III. The game is described in Section IV and the
equilibrium strategies are derived in Section V. Results are
discussed in Section VI. We conclude in Section VII.
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II. RELATED WORK
Unlike age, throughput as the payoff function in wireless
networks has been extensively studied from the game theoretic
point of view (see [5]–[7]). Age of information has been
investigated for networks with multiple users sharing a slotted
system in [8]–[13]. In [8] and [9] authors considered scheduled
and random access mechanisms. In [10] authors studied a
scheduling problem with respect to age and in [11] authors
studied a multi-source multi-hop wireless network with age
as a performance metric. In [12] authors investigated age
in a CSMA-based network and formulated an optimization
problem to minimize the total average age of the network.
In [13] authors considered the problem of minimizing the age
over a random access channel and proposed distributed age-
efficient transmission policies.
In [3], [14]–[16] authors studied games with age as the pay-
off function. In [14] and [15], authors studied an adversarial
setting where one player aims to maintain the freshness of
information updates while the other player aims to prevent
this. In earlier work [16], we proposed a game theoretic
approach to study the coexistence of Dedicated Short Range
Communication (DSRC) and WiFi, where the DSRC network
desires to minimize the average age of information and the
WiFi network aims to maximize the average throughput. In [3],
via the repeated game model we were able to shed better
light on the interaction of age and throughput optimizing
networks. Unlike these works, here we provide insights into
how competing nodes that value timeliness of their information
at others would share the spectrum using a CSMA/CA based
medium access.
III. NETWORK MODEL
Our network consists of N nodes, indexed 1, 2, . . . , N ,
which contend for access to a shared wireless medium. Each
node uses a CSMA/CA based access mechanism. We assume
that all nodes can sense each other’s packet transmissions.
This allows modeling the CSMA/CA mechanism as a slotted
multiaccess system. A slot may either be (a) an idle slot in
which no node transmits a packet, (b) a successful transmission
slot in which exactly one node transmits an update packet that
is decoded successfully by all other nodes, (c) a collision slot
in which more than one node transmits a packet and as a result
none of the packets are successfully decoded. We assume that
all nodes always have a fresh status update packet to send.
Each node would like to minimize the age of its status update
packets at the other nodes in the network.
Let τi denote the probability with which node i attempts
transmission in a slot. Let pI be the probability of an idle slot.
We have
pI =
N∏
i=1
(1− τi). (1)
Let p(i)S be the probability of a successful transmission by
node i in a slot and let pS be the probability of a successful
transmission in a slot. We say that node i sees a busy slot if
∆i(t)
σS
∆i(0)
t1 t2 t3 tn tn+1t4 t5 t
Fig. 1: Sample path of age ∆i(t) of node i’s updates at other nodes
in the network. ∆i(0) is the initial age. A successful transmission
resets the age to σS. The time instants tn, where, n ∈ {1, 2, . . . },
show the slot boundaries. The slot lengths are determined by the type
of slot.
in the slot node i doesn’t transmit and exactly one other node
transmits. Let p(−i)S be the probability that a busy slot is seen
by node i. Let pC be the probability that a collision occurs in
a slot. We have
p
(i)
S = τi
N∏
j=1
j 6=i
(1− τj), pS =
N∑
i=1
p
(i)
S ,
p
(−i)
S =
N∑
j=1
j 6=i
τj
N∏
k=1
k 6=j,k 6=i
(1− τk) and pC = 1− pI − pS. (2)
Let σI , σS and σC denote the lengths of an idle, successful,
and collision slot, respectively. Next we define the age of a
node’s status updates at other nodes in terms of the above
probabilities and slot lengths.
A. Age of a Node’s Information
Let ui(t) be the timestamp of the most recent status update
of a node i at other nodes j 6= i at time t. The age of node i’s
update at any other node j at time t is ∆i(t) = t− ui(t) [1].
We assume that a status update packet that node i attempts to
transmit in a slot contains an update of age 0 at the beginning
of the slot.
Note that node i’s age at the end of a slot is determined by
its age at the beginning of the slot and the type of the slot. As
a result, node i’s age at any other node j either resets to σS if
a successful transmission occurs or increases by σI, σC or σS
at all other nodes, respectively, when an idle slot, collision slot
or a busy slot occurs. Figure 1 shows an example sample path
of the age ∆i(t). In what follows we will drop the explicit
mention of time t and let ∆−i and ∆i, respectively, be the age
of node i’s update at the beginning and end of the slot.
The age ∆i at the end of a slot is thus a random variable
whose conditional PMF given ∆−i is
P [∆i = δi|∆−i = δ−i ] =

pI δi = δ
−
i + σI,
pC δi = δ
−
i + σC,
p
(−i)
S δi = δ
−
i + σS,
p
(i)
S δi = σS,
0 otherwise.
(3)
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Fig. 2: Payoff matrix with slot lengths and age values for the game G when 3 nodes contend for the medium. Nodes can
choose between transmit (T ) and idle (I).
Using (3), we define the conditional expected age
∆˜i
∆
= E[∆i = δi|∆−i = δ−i ].
= (1− p(i)S )δ−i + (pIσI + pSσS + pCσC). (4)
IV. GAME MODEL
We define a one-shot multiple access game to model the
interaction between the nodes in a slot. In every CSMA/CA
slot, nodes must compete for access with the goal of minimiz-
ing their age. We capture the interaction in a slot as a non-
cooperative parameterized strategic one-shot multiple access
game G = (N , (Sk)k∈N , (uk)k∈N ,∆−), where N is the set
of players, Sk is the set of strategies of player k, uk is the
payoff of player k and∆− is the additional parameter input to
the game G, which is the vector of ages of the nodes’ updates
(∆−i for node i) at the beginning of the slot. We define the
game G next.
• Players: The set of players N = {1, 2, . . . ,N} is simply
the set of all nodes in the network.
• Strategy Space: Let T denote transmit and I denote
idle. The set of pure strategies for node i is Si = {T , I}.
We allow nodes to play mixed strategies. Define Φi as
the set of all probability distributions over the set of
strategies Si of player i. A mixed strategy for player
i is an element φi ∈ Φi, where φi is a probability
distribution over Si. We require φi(si) ≥ 0 for all
si ∈ Si and
∑
si∈Si φi(si) = 1. In this work, since
the strategy spaces are binary, a mixed strategy for node
i is identified by specifying a probability τi ∈ [0, 1]
with which i attempts transmission in a slot. As a result,
the probability distribution corresponding to node i is
φi = {φi(T ), φi(I)} = {τi, 1− τi}.
• Payoffs: We can calculate the probabilities (1)-(2) for
each node in the network. The probabilities when sub-
stituted in (3) can be used to calculate the average age
in (4). For every node i, its expected payoff when its own
transmission probability is τi and the vector of others’
transmission probabilities is τ−i is given by
ui(τi, τ−i) = −∆˜i(τi, τ−i). (5)
Each node would like to maximize its payoff, which is
the same as minimizing its expected age at the end of the
stage.
V. EQUILIBRIUM STRATEGIES
We will separately consider two common medium access
settings found in CSMA/CA (a) σC < σS and (b) σC ≥ σS.
The first setting is akin to RTS/CTS (request-to-send and clear-
to-send) based medium access defined in the 802.11 MAC.
The use of short RTS/CTS messages to reserve the medium
before accessing it to send a larger data payload (status update)
packet reduces the average length of a collision slot. The
second setting is akin to the basic access mechanism defined
in the 802.11 MAC and doesn’t use RTS/CTS. All collisions
are between packets carrying data payloads.
A. When σC ≤ σS
Proposition 1 summarizes the strategy of choice for nodes
in the network when the collision slots are shorter than or
equal to successful transmission slots.
Proposition 1. When σC ≤ σS, for the one-shot multiple
access game G, transmit (T ) is a weakly dominant strategy.
Proof:. As stated in [2], si ∈ Si is a weakly dominant strategy
for player i, if for any possible combination of the other play-
ers’ strategies, player i’s payoff from si is weakly more than
that from s′i. That is, ui(si, s−i) ≥ ui(s′i, s−i),∀s−i ∈ S−i.
We verify that for every node i, pure strategy T weakly
dominates the pure strategy I. We fix a node i. Any vector
of pure strategies s−i played by nodes other than node i can
be assigned to one of the following cases: (1) exactly one of
the other nodes chooses to transmit while others stay idle or,
(2) more than one of the other nodes chooses to transmit, or
(3) all other nodes choose to stay idle. We now consider these
cases in detail and illustrate each of them using the payoff
matrix of a 3-player game shown in Figure 2.
Case 1: Exactly one of the other nodes chooses to transmit
(T ): In this case, if node i chooses to transmit, a collision slot
occurs and its age becomes ∆i = ∆−i +σC. On the other hand,
if node i chooses to stay idle, it will see a busy slot and age at
the end of the slot will be set to ∆i = ∆−i + σS. In this case,
if σC < σS, node i will choose to transmit (T ) and if σC = σS
node i will be indifferent between idle and transmit. The above
argument can be demonstrated using the payoff matrix of a 3-
player game (see Figure 2). Assume node 2 chooses transmit
(idle) and node 3 chooses idle (transmit). In this case, transmit
is a weakly dominant strategy for node 1 if u1(T , T , I) ≥
u1(I, T , I) and u1(T , I, T ) ≥ u1(I, I, T ). As shown in
Figure 2, u1(T , T , I) = u1(T , I, T ) = −(∆−1 + σC) and
u1(I, T , I) = u1(I, I, T ) = −(∆−1 + σS). When σC < σS,
u1(T , T , I) > u1(I, T , I) and u1(T , I, T ) > u1(I, I, T ),
whereas, when σC = σS, u1(T , T , I) = u1(I, T , I) and
u1(T , I, T ) = u1(I, I, T ).
Case 2: More than one of the other nodes choose to transmit
(T ): In this case, collision will occur. Irrespective of the choice
made by node i, ∆i = ∆−i +σC. Player i is indifferent between
idle (I) and transmit (T ) when σC ≤ σS. This corresponds to
the case in the 3-player game when node 2 and node 3 choose
transmit and node 1 will prefer transmit (T ) if u1(T , T , T ) ≥
u1(I, T , T ). As shown in Figure 2, u1(T , T , T ) = −(∆−1 +
σC) and u1(I, T , T ) = −(∆−1 +σC). Clearly, u1(T , T , T ) =
u1(I, T , T ) and node 1 is indifferent between transmit and
idle.
Case 3: All other nodes choose to stay idle (I): In this case,
suppose node i along with other nodes chooses to stay idle
too. We have ∆i = ∆−i + σI. In case node i transmits, its
status update will be successfully received and its age at all
other nodes will reset to ∆i = σS. Further note that the age of
a node’s status at other nodes at the beginning of the slot is at
least as large as the length σS of a successful transmission slot.
This is because σS is the time a fresh update must age before it
is successfully received by another node. Thus ∆−i + σI > σS
and the node will prefer to transmit. In the 3-player game,
for this case, node 1 will prefer transmit if u1(T , I, I) ≥
u1(I, I, I). We have u1(T , I, I) = −σS and u1(I, I, I) =
−(∆−1 + σI). Thus, node 1 chooses transmit.
B. When σC > σS
For this medium access setting, no weakly dominant strat-
egy exists and we look for mixed strategies.
Proposition 2. For the one-shot multiple access game G,
when σC > σS no weakly dominant strategy exists.
Proof:. Similar to Proposition 1, we assume that in a slot, for
different selections of strategies by other nodes in the network,
node i may choose either to transmit (T ) or stay idle (I),
depending on which strategy gives a higher payoff. To find the
strategy that is beneficial for node i, we consider the following
cases: (1) exactly one of the other nodes chooses to transmit
while others stay idle, or (2) all other nodes choose to stay idle,
or (3) more than one of the other nodes chooses to transmit.
Case 1: Exactly one of the other nodes chooses to transmit
(T ): In this case, if node i chooses to transmit, a collision
slot occurs and its age becomes ∆i = ∆−i + σC. In contrast,
if node i chooses to stay idle, it will see a busy slot and age
at the end of the slot will be set to ∆i = ∆−i + σS. Since,
σC > σS, node i will choose to stay idle (I).
Case 2: All other nodes choose to stay idle: In this case if
node i chooses to stay idle too, we have ∆i = ∆−i + σI and
if it chooses to transmit, its status update will be successfully
received and its age at all other nodes will reset to ∆i = σS.
Since age of node i’s status at other nodes at the beginning of
the slot (∆−i ) is at least as large as σS, ∆
−
i +σI > σS. Hence,
node i will prefer to transmit (T ).
Case 1 and Case 2 shows that player’s preferences are op-
posite, hence, the game has no weakly dominant strategy.
We consider mixed strategies and derive the Nash equilib-
rium when the initial ages of the nodes’ updates lie within
a certain assumed region. As stated in [17], every finite
strategic-form game has a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium
(MSNE). For a strategic game G, a mixed-strategy profile
φ∗ = (φ∗1, φ
∗
2, . . . , φ
∗
N) is a Nash equilibrium [17], if φ
∗
i is
the best response of player i to his opponents’ mixed strategy
φ∗−i ∈ Φ−i, for all i ∈ N . We have
ui(φ
∗
i , φ
∗
−i) ≥ ui(φi, φ∗−i),∀φi ∈ Φi,
where φ∗ ∈∏|N |i=1Φi is the profile of mixed strategy. As stated
earlier, the mixed strategy for player i is identified by the
probability τi ∈ [0, 1] with which node i attempts transmission
in a slot. Let ∆˜− = (1/N)
N∑
i=1
∆−i , which is the average of
the ages of nodes’ updates at the beginning of the slot.
Proposition 3. If σC > σS and
∆˜− − (N− 1)∆
−
i
N
>
σS − σI
N
, ∀i ∈ N , (6)
The MSNE is given by
τ∗i =
σS − σI + (N− 1)∆−i −N∆˜−
NσS − (N− 1)σC − σI + (N− 1)∆−i −N∆˜−
,
∀i ∈ N .
The condition (6) ensures that τ∗i ∈ (0, 1).
Proof:. For node i to randomize, when other nodes play their
mixed strategies τ∗−i, both the pure strategies of transmit and
idle must be best responses of i. Note that the choice of T
and I are, respectively, equivalent to setting τi = 1 and τi = 0
in (5). We require ui(1, τ∗−i) = ui(0, τ
∗
−i). Using (5) we can
write
ui(1, τ
∗
−i) =
−
1− N∏
j 6=i
(1− τ∗j )
 (∆−i + σC)− N∏
j 6=i
(1− τ∗j )σS, (7a)
ui(0, τ
∗
−i) =
−
1− N∏
j 6=i
(1− τ∗j )−
N∑
j 6=i
τ∗j
N∏
k 6=j,k 6=i
(1− τ∗k )

(∆−i + σC)−
N∏
j 6=i
(1− τ∗j )(∆−i + σI)
Case σC Vector of Ages
seen at the be-
ginning of the
stage, ∆−
Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium,
τ ∗
Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium
I 0.1σS (σS, 2σS, 3σS) (2.4877,−1.2782, 0.3549) (T , T , T ), (T , I, T ), (I, T , T ), (T , T , I)
II 0.1σS (σS, σS, σS) (−0.0055,−0.0055,−0.0055) (T , T , T ), (T , I, T ), (I, T , T ), (T , T , I)
III 2σS (σS, 2σS, 3σS) (0.6008, 0.3355,−0.9804) (T , T , T ), (I, I, T ), (T , I, I), (I, T , I)
IV 2σS (2σS, 3σS, 3σS) (0.6008, 0.3355, 0.3355) (T , T , T ), (I, I, T ), (T , I, I), (I, T , I)
V 2σS (2σS, 3σS, 4σS) (0.6672, 0.5012, 0.0049) (T , T , T ), (I, I, T ), (T , I, I), (I, T , I)
TABLE I: Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium τ ∗ computed using (9) and the pure strategy Nash Equilibrium corresponding to different
selections of N = 3, σC and ∆ computed by substituting the values of σC and ∆ in the payoff matrix shown in Figure 2. Other parameters
used in the computation are σS = 1.01, σI = 0.01.
−
 N∑
j 6=i
τ∗j
N∏
k 6=j,k 6=i
(1− τ∗k )
 (∆−i + σS). (7b)
Equation (7a) is explained by the fact that since node i chooses
to transmit the slot is either a collision slot or a successful
transmission slot. It is the former if one or more of the other
nodes transmit. It is the latter in case none of the other nodes
transmit. Similarly, Equation (7b) is explained by the fact that
since i chooses to stay idle, the slot can be either idle, a
collision slot, or a successful transmission slot, as determined
by the probabilistic choices made by the other nodes, which
are governed by τ∗−i.
Equating ui(1, τ∗−i) and ui(0, τ
∗
−i), for node i, we obtain
N∑
j 6=i
τj
1− τj =
σS − σI −∆−i
σS − σC . (8)
On solving the resulting system of N equations, we get the
mixed equilibrium
τ∗i =
σS − σI + (N− 1)∆−i −N∆˜−
NσS − (N− 1)σC − σI + (N− 1)∆−i −N∆˜−
,
∀i ∈ N . (9)
Next, we must find the conditions that ensure that τ∗i lies
in the interval (0, 1). We consider the following two cases:
Case I: When [σS − σI + (N − 1)∆−i − N∆˜−] > 0 and
[NσS− (N−1)σC−σI + (N−1)∆−i −N∆˜−] > 0, for τ∗i > 0
we get:
∆˜− − N− 1
N
∆−i <
σS − σI
N
, (10a)
∆˜− − N− 1
N
∆−i <
σS − σI
N
− (N− 1)(σC − σS)
N
. (10b)
For τ∗i < 1, we get [σS− σI + (N− 1)∆−i −N∆˜−] < [NσS−
(N−1)σC−σI +(N−1)∆−i −N∆˜−], which on simplification
gives σS > σC. Note that in Proposition 1 we showed that
when σS > σC, the one-shot game G has transmit (T ) as a
weakly dominant strategy. As a result, we can discard this
case, since for no selection of ∆−, the inequalities in (10a)
and (10b) will hold true.
Case II: When [σS − σI + (N − 1)∆−i − N∆˜−] < 0 and
[NσS− (N−1)σC−σI + (N−1)∆−i −N∆˜−] < 0, for τ∗i > 0
we get:
∆˜− − N− 1
N
∆−i >
σS − σI
N
, (11a)
∆˜− − N− 1
N
∆−i >
σS − σI
N
− (N− 1)(σC − σS)
N
. (11b)
For τ∗i < 1, we get [σS− σI + (N− 1)∆−i −N∆˜−] > [NσS−
(N−1)σC−σI +(N−1)∆−i −N∆˜−], which on simplification
gives σS < σC. Equations (11a), (11b) give us the condition
∆˜− − N−1N ∆−i > max{σS−σIN , σS−σIN − (N−1)(σC−σS)N }, which
implies ∆˜− − N−1N ∆−i > σS−σIN .
Corollary 1. The equilibrium strategy τ∗i of node i is a
monotonically decreasing function of ∆−i and a monotonically
increasing function of ∆−j , where, j 6= i.
Proof. Consider the following derivatives
∂τ∗i
∂∆−i
=
(N− 1)(N− 2)(σS − σC)
(NσS − (N− 1)σC − σI + (N− 1)∆−i −N∆˜−)2
,
∂τ∗i
∂∆−j
=
(N− 1)(σC − σS)
(NσS − (N− 1)σC − σI + (N− 1)∆−i −N∆˜−)2
.
Clearly, when σC > σS, ∂τi/∂∆−i is negative and ∂τi/∂∆
−
j
is positive.
Corollary 1 implies that as a node’s age at the beginning
of the slot increases, it becomes conservative and access the
medium with smaller probability, while the other nodes in
the network become aggressive and access the medium with
higher probability. As we later show empirically, this reduces
the probability of successful transmission for the node with
large age while increasing it for the other nodes. As a result,
the node with large age sees fewer successful transmissions
and its age keeps increasing.
VI. EMPIRICAL EVALUATION
In this section, we empirically demonstrate Proposition 1,
Proposition 3 and Corollary 1 using the 3-player one-shot
game. Table I shows the scenarios when τ∗i /∈ (0, 1) and when
τ∗i ∈ (0, 1) for different selections of σC and ∆. Since idle
slots are much smaller than both collision slots and successful
transmission slots, we set σI = 0.01 and σS = 1.01. We
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Fig. 3: Probability of successful transmission of each node (p(i)S )
for different values of ∆−3 , i.e., age of node 3 at the beginning of
the slot, when ∆−1 = 2σS and ∆
−
2 = 3σS.
compute the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium τ ∗ for different
scenarios using (9).
As shown in Table I, when σC < σS (see scenarios I-II),
τ∗i /∈ (0, 1). Note that this is in agreement with Proposition 1
which states that transmit is a weakly dominant strategy when
σC < σS and hence node would choose to transmit rather
than randomize between pure strategies. When σC > σS, in
scenario III, τ∗i /∈ (0, 1), whereas, in scenarios IV-V, τ∗i ∈
(0, 1). In scenario III, while σC > σS, the inequality ∆˜− −
(N−1)∆−i
N >
σS−σI
N , ∀i ∈ N , is not satisfied. In line with
Proposition 3, since both inequalities are not satisfied, τ∗i /∈
(0, 1). In contrast, in scenarios IV-V, since σC > σS and the
inequality ∆˜−− (N−1)∆−iN > σS−σIN holds true ∀i ∈ N , we get
τ∗i ∈ (0, 1), ∀i ∈ N .
The equilibrium strategy values in scenarios IV-V are in
agreement with Corollary 1. As shown in Table I, in scenario
IV-V, we can see that as the age of node 3 at the beginning of
the slot increases from 3σS to 4σS while the age of other nodes
is the same, the node becomes conservative and its equilibrium
strategy reduces from 0.3355 to 0.0049, whereas, node 1 and
2 become aggressive and their equilibrium strategy increases
from 0.6008 to 0.6672 and 0.3355 to 0.5012, respectively. This
reduces the probability of successful transmission for node 3,
while that for other nodes increases. Figure 3 illustrates this
for different selections of ∆−3 . As a result, node 3 sees fewer
successful tranmissions and its age keeps increasing.
Further, for each scenario we find the pure strategy Nash
equilibrium by substituting the values of σS, σI, σC and ∆−
in the payoff matrix shown in Figure 2. We see that for all
selections of σC, multiple pure strategy Nash equilibria exist.
While (T , T , T ) is a common equilibrium strategy for all
selections of σC, we see that when σC < σS, the equilib-
rium strategy set comprises of (T , I, T ), (I, T , T ), (T , T , I)
indicating that nodes prefer transmit over idle. This is because
when σC < σS, the age due to a collision (∆i = ∆−i + σC) is
less than that due to a busy slot (∆i = ∆−i + σS). Similarly,
when σC > σS, the equilibrium strategy set consists of
(I, I, T ), (T , I, I), (I, T , I) indicating that nodes prefer idle
over transmit, since the age due to a busy slot (∆i = ∆−i +σS)
would be less than that due to a collision (∆i = ∆−i + σC).
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We formulated a non-cooperative one-shot multiple access
game with N nodes as players, where each node shares the
spectrum using a CSMA/CA based access mechanism and
would like to minimize the age of its updates at the other
nodes. We investigated the equilibrium strategies of nodes in
a CSMA/CA slot for two distinct medium access settings (a)
collision are shorter than successful transmissions, and (b)
collisions are longer. We showed that when collisions are
shorter, transmit is a weakly dominant strategy and when
collisions are longer, no weakly dominant strategy exists and
under certain conditions on the ages at the beginning of the
slot, we derive the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium.
In the examples illustrated in Table I, for the values of ages
for which the MSNE, as derived analytically, does not lie in
the interval (0, 1), we see existence of multiple pure Nash
equilibrium. This tells us we need to further analyze the game
to gain qualitative insight into the equilibria. We leave this
analysis for future work.
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